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Promissory Estoppel
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL IN WASHINGTON
Promissory estoppel was expressly recognized in Washington in 1940.1
The doctrine provides relief for a promisee who foreseeably and justifi-
ably relies on a promise even though the parties did not form a contract.
The aim of the doctrine is remedial:2 to redress harm that has befallen an
innocent promisee, not to reward a party for his reliance. 3 Promissory
estoppel, which protects the promisee's reliance interest, 4 operates to re-
turn the promisee to the position he occupied before the promise was
made.
Hill v. Corbett5 identified the five elements necessary to recovery under
a promissory estoppel theory. They are: "(1) [A] promise which (2) the
promisor should reasonably expect to cause the promisee to change his
position and (3) which does cause the promisee to change his position (4)
justifiably relying upon the promise, in such a manner that (5) injustice
can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.' '6
This comment clarifies the considerable confusion that befogs the
promissory estoppel doctrine in Washington. 7 Part I discusses situations
1. Luther v. National Bank of Commerce, 2 Wn. 2d 470, 484, 98 P.2d 667, 673 (1940). The
doctrine of promissory estoppel was impliedly adopted much earlier. See, e.g., Coleman v. Larson,
49 Wash. 321, 325, 95 P. 262, 264 (1908)(holding that "where the promisee accepts the promise,
enters into possession and makes improvements on the land, or does some other act on the faith of the
promise which materially changes his condition," equity makes the promise enforceable).
2. See notes 92-95 and accompanying text infra.
3. See Seavey, Reliance Upon Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, 64 HARv. L. REv. 913,
926(1951).
4. A promisee has three types of interests that can be protected by providing a remedy for reason-
able reliance on a promise. Fuller and Perdue identified the reliance interest, the expectancy interest,
and the restitutionary interest in their seminal work, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: I,
46 YALE L. J. 52, 53-54 (1936).
The objective of a reliance interest recovery is to return the promisee to the position he occupied
before the promise was made. The remedy would be a return of all reasonable costs incurred by the
promisee in reliance on the promise. An expectancy interest recovery, in contrast, gives the promisee
the benefit of the promise by putting him in the position he would have occupied had the promisor
performed his promise. Anticipated profits are the normal measure of relief. Finally, a restitutionary
interest recovery places both the promisor and the promisee in their pre-promise position by disgorg-
ing the benefits of the promisee's performance from the promisor. The measure of recovery would be
the value of the benefits conferred on the promisor.
This comment contends that the most appropriate measure of recovery under the promissory estop-
pel doctrine is the promisee's reliance interest. See notes 107-132 and accompanying text infra.
5. 33 Wn. 2d 219, 204 P.2d 845 (1945).
6. Id. at 222-23,204 P.2d at 847.
7. "By 1937, the Washington cases in which a promise was sought to be enforced because of an
unbargained-for and detrimental change of position by the promisee in reliance on receiving the
promised performance, were in a state of confusion." Shattuck, Contracts in Washington,
1937-1957, 34 WASH. L. REv. 24, 70 (1959)(footnote omitted). The years since 1937 have seen
further inconsistent application of the doctrine. See, e.g., Ferrer v. Taft Structurals, Inc., 21 Wn.
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in which a promisee, though unable to establish a traditional contract, 8
can invoke promissory estoppel to obtain relief. Part II examines the ele-
ments of promissory estoppel identified in Hill and illustrates their appli-
cation in various fact patterns.
I. TRADITIONAL CONTRACT LAW AND PROMISSORY
ESTOPPEL
Promissory estoppel recovery does not require the same elements as
traditional contract recovery. Formation of a contract ordinarily requires
bargaining between the parties. Bargaining demands an objective mani-
festation of mutual assent and consideration. 9 A contract may also have to
meet the formal requirements of the Statute of Frauds. Mutual assent and
consideration, on the other hand, are not elements of promissory estop-
pel. Even the Statute of Frauds may not be an absolute bar.' 0 Thus, the
promissory estoppel doctrine supplies a remedy for a promisee when tra-
ditional contract law does not.
In an effort to provide litigants with relief under traditional contract
doctrine, courts have unnecessarily distorted contract principles." Ap-
plying the promissory estoppel doctrine in cases where traditional con-
tract law is inapplicable leads to a more logically defensible solution.
App. 832, 587 P.2d 177 (1978)(an accepted bid to perform construction work was construed as an
unaccepted offer); Central Heat, Inc. v. Daily Olympian, Inc., 74 Wn. 2d 126, 443 P.2d 544
(1968)(promise to take steam heat for a year was found to be without consideration as the promisor
did not in fact require any steam). These cases are discussed more fully at notes 23 and 118.
8. Although promissory estoppel is a contract doctrine, see REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 90, Comment d (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965), it should be distinguished from more traditional contract
principles. Promissory estoppel contains both contract and tort elements, see, e.g., Seavey, Reliance
Upon Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, 64 HARV. L. REv. 913, 926 (1951); Shattuck, Gratui-
tous Promises-A New Writ?, 35 MICH. L. REv. 908, 909-14 (1937). The key distinction between
promissory estoppel and more traditional contract doctrines is the flexibility of promissory estoppel.
With promissory estoppel, courts can "make the remedy fit the crime" and provide relief that de-
pends upon the special circumstances and merits of the claim of all parties. IA A. CORBIN, CON-
TRACTS § 205, at 236 (1963). The doctrine of promissory estoppel will not be referred to as a contract
doctrine in the text of this comment.
9. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 3, 4 (1932); 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 10, at 22 (1963).
10. See notes 24-29 and accompanying text infra.
11. Courts have often strained to find consideration for a promise, and thus enforce a contract,
when it would appear that no contract was ever intended by the parties. See Shattuck, Contracts in
Washington, 1937-1957, 34 WASH. L. REv. 24, 73 (1959). An excellent example is found in the
cases which transform a gratuitous promise to make a gift to charity into an enforcable contract by
construing the charity's reliance on the gift as consideration. See, e.g., Allegheny College v. Na-
tional Chatauqua County Bank of Jamestown, 246 N.Y. 369, 159 N.E. 173 (1927); Depauw Univer-
sity v. Ankeny, 97 Wash. 451, 166 P. 1148 (1917); Young Men's Christian Ass'n of Wenatchee v.
Olds Co., 84 Wash. 630, 147 P. 406 (1915).
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A. Mutual Assent
To form a contract, two or more parties must agree to something. Mu-
tual assent, or "meeting of the minds," 12 means that each party either
begins performance or agrees 13 to begin performance. 14 Since promissory
estoppel may apply in the absence of an agreement between the parties,
mutual assent is not required. 15 Instead, the relevant questions are
whether the promisee's reliance on the promise was foreseeable and
whether his reliance was justifiable.
To illustrate the distinction, suppose an uncle promises to give his
nephew $1,000. The nephew buys a new stereo, expecting to be reim-
bursed. Mutual assent is lacking because the parties reached no agree-
ment to exchange promises or performances. The nephew, therefore, has
no contract upon which to sue. If, however, the nephew's reliance on the
promise was foreseeable and was justifiable, he could obtain relief under
the promissory estoppel doctrine.
B. Consideration
Traditional contract law is based upon consideration. Unless both par-
ties supply consideration, promises in a contract will not be enforced. 16
Promissory estoppel, in contrast, does not require consideration as a con-
dition to recovery.17 The promisee's reasonable reliance on the promise
substitutes for consideration. Thus, to identify the theory of recovery,
reliance on the promise must be carefully distinguished from considera-
tion for the promise. 18
12. Wetherbee v. Gary, 62 Wn. 2d 123, 127-28, 381 P.2d 237, 240 (1963). The Washington
authority is clear that mutual assent is an essential element of every contract. See, e.g., Richards v.
Kuppinger, 46 Wn. 2d 62, 66-67, 278 P.2d 395, 398 (1955); Swanson v. Holmquist, 13 Wn. App.
939,942, 539 P.2d 104, 106 (1975).
13. An agreement must be objectively manifested. The unexpressed intentions of the parties are
irrelevant. See Plumbing Shop, Inc. v. Pitts, 67 Wn. 2d 514, 517,408 P.2d 382, 384 (1965).
14. "Manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange requires that each party either make a prom-
ise or begin or render a performance." REsTATEmEr (SECOND) OF CorTACrs § 20 (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1964).
15. See Shattuck, Gratuitous Promises-A New Writ?, 35 MIcH. L. Rav. 908, 941-42 (1937).
16. S. WiLtsroN, CoNTRAcrs § 99, at 367 (1957).
17. "In order for [promissory] estoppel to arise . . . it is not necessary that the one estopped
receive some benefit or consideration from the particular transaction; . . . Central Heat, Inc. v.
Daily Olympian, 74 Wn. 2d 126, 133, 443 P.2d 544, 548 (1968)(quoting Lacy v. Wozencraft, 188
Okla. 19, 20, 105 P.2d 781, 783 (1940)).
18. "[T]he boundary between bargain and reliance is demonstrably tenuous. The thing done by a
promise in reliance on the promise is often a thing which would have been consideration had the
promisor requested it." Shattuck, Contracts in Washington, 1937-1957, 34 W sH. L. Rev. 24, 73
(1959).
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To illustrate, suppose A promises to pay for B's trip to Europe. B
agrees to take the trip and, in reliance on A's promise, flies to London.
Neither B's promise to take the trip nor her flying to London is considera-
tion for A's promise. A was not bargaining for B to take the trip, but only
expressing his willingness to pay for the trip if B should decide to go.
Neither a promise to accept a gift nor the receiving of a gift is considera-
tion. 19 B's flying to London, however, would be reliance on A's promise,
and might be a basis of recovery under promissory estoppel.
The key to the distinction between consideration for the promise and
reliance on the promise is bargaining. 20 Consideration is not merely a
thing, but the process of bargaining itself.2 1 If the promisor actually of-
fers his promise in exchange for the promisee's change of position, then
the promisee's act or forbearance is consideration. 22 For example, if in
the previous hypothetical A was bargaining for a commitment by B to
take the trip, then either B's promise to take the trip or her actual perform-
ance could be consideration for A's promise, and could create an enforce-
able contract. 23
C. Statute of Frauds
Under some circumstances the Statute of Frauds 24 will render an other-
19. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 4-2, at 135 (2d ed. 1977).
20. "Ordinarily the key difference between a promise supported by consideration and a promise
supported by promissory estoppel is that in the former case the detriment is bargained for in exchange
for the promise; in the latter, there is no bargain." J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAWOF CONTRACTS §
6-I, at 203 (2d ed. 1977).
21. See Patterson, An Apology for Consideration, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 932 (1958): RESTATE-
MENTOF CONTRACTS § 75 (1932).
22. See Huberdeau v. Desmarais, 79 Wn. 2d 432, 439, 486 P.2d 1074, 1078 (1971); Williams
Fruit Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 3 Wn. App. 276,281,474 P.2d 577, 581 (1970).
23. The Washington Supreme Court had some difficulty with the concept of consideration in
Central Heat, Inc. v. Daily Olympian, Inc., 74 Wn. 2d 126,443 P.2d 544 (1968), a decision purport-
edly based on promissory estoppel. Defendant, a newspaper company, promised to buy steam heat
from plaintiff, after agreeing with the other major customers of the heating plant that they would all
take steam heat for one more year and then plaintiff would go out of business. Before the year had
begun, but after the contract was entered into, plaintiff's board of directors, of which defendant's
business manager was a member, voted to modify plaintiff's billing procedure. The board decided
that if a customer should reduce or discontinue the amount of steam normally required, he would be
obligated for that normal amount regardless of his actual consumption. Defendant took no heat for the
year and refused to pay anything. Recovery for plaintiff was granted by promissory estoppel, rather
than by contract, because of the uncertainty of consideration, in that defendant did not actually use
any steam. Yet there was consideration for defendant's promise to take heat in plaintiff's promise to
provide heat. It should be irrelevant that defendant never actually required heat, because he received
the benefit of the right to have heat. The case would have been more correctly analyzed under con-
tract doctrine than under promissory estoppel doctrine.
24. The Washington Statute of Frauds applies to (1) agreements that are not to be performed
within one year from their making, (2) special promises to answer for the debt, default, or misdoings
Vol. 55:795, 1980
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wise valid contract unenforceable. 25 Whether the Statute of Frauds also
applies to the promissory estoppel doctrine had been an unanswered ques-
tion until the recent case of Klinke v. Famous Recipe Fried Chicken,
Inc.26 In Klinke, the Washington Supreme Court limited the application
of promissory estoppel to situations where the promisor additionally
promises, explicitly or implicitly, to put the original parol promise in
writing.
In Klinke, defendant orally promised to award plaintiff a franchise if
plaintiff would leave his job in Alaska, move to Seattle, and find a loca-
tion for the fast-food restaurant. After plaintiff did what he was requested
to do, defendant decided not to award him the franchise. 27 Plaintiff
sought damages under both contract and promissory estoppel theories.
Although the court of appeals 28 affirmed summary judgment against
plaintiffs contract claim because of noncompliance with the Statute of
Frauds, summary judgment against plaintiff's promissory estoppel claim
was vacated. The court held that promissory estoppel is applicable to
parol promises notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds.29
The supreme court declined30 to adopt the lower court's rule. 31 Instead,
the court concluded that the promissory estoppel doctrine requires an ad-
ditional promise, either explicit or implicit, to make a memorandum of
of another, (3) promises made upon consideration of marriage, except mutual promises to marry, (4)
special promises made by an executor or administrator to answer damages out of his own estate, and
(5) agreements authorizing or employing an agent to sell or purchase real estate for a commission or
compensation. WASH. REv. CODE § 19.36.010 (1979).
25. The Statute of Frauds is not an equitable doctrine but "a positive statutory mandate which
renders void those undertakings which offend it." Smith v. Twohy, 70 Wn. 2d 721, 725, 425 P.2d
12, 15 (1967).
26. 94Wn. 2d255,616P.2d 644 (1980).
27. The defendant decided not to locate in the State of Washington. Id. at 258, 616 P.2d at 646.
28. 24 Wn. App. 202, 600 P.2d 1034 (1979), rev'd in part, aff 'd in part, 94 Wn. 2d 255, 616
P.2d 644 (1980).
29. The court of appeals expressly adopted §217A of the Restatement of Contracts, which pro-
vides that:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the
part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce the action or forbearance is enforce-
able notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise. The remedy granted for breach is to be limited as justice requires. RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF CoNTRAcr § 217A(I) (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973).
Id. at 212, 600 P.2d at 1041.
30. "The unforeseen application of section 217A to areas of law outside the scope of the facts of
this case convinces us that it would be unwise to adopt that section now unless necessary to effectuate
justice. This is not mandated by this case." Klinke v. Famous Recipe Fried Chicken, Inc., 94 Wn. 2d
255, 262, 616 P.2d 644, 648 (1980).
31. The court of appeals decision to vacate summary judgment for defendant was affirmed by the
-supreme court because sufficient facts were asserted to show that defendant may have promised to
execute a written franchise agreement. 94 Wn. 2d 255,260, 616 P.2d 644, 647 (1980).
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the original promise. 32 In other words, in order to recover under promis-
sory estoppel for a parol promise within the Statute of Frauds, a promisor
must make two promises. A promisor must first promise to act or forbear
and then also promise to make a writing. Absent this second promise,
recovery will be denied. The Klinke rule is unsatisfactory for two reasons.
First, the rule will not protect all promisees who reasonably rely on a
promise within the Statute of Frauds. 33 Second, the rule is premised on a
legal fiction. It proposes that a promisee changes his position in reliance
on the promise of a writing. 34 Yet, a promisee does not rely on the prom-
ise to make a memorandum, but on the original promise itself.35
II. THE ELEMENTS OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL IN
WASHINGTON
This part examines the elements of the promissory estoppel doctrine
identified in Hill v. Corbett and developed through Washington case law.
32. Instead of adopting the more expansive court of appeals rule, the court reaffirmed its holding
in In re Estate of Nelson, 85 Wn. 2d 602, 537 P.2d 765 (1975), that:
A party who promises, implicity or explicitly, to make a memorandum of a contract in order to
satisfy the statute of frauds, and then breaks that promise, is estopped to interpose the statute as a
defense to the enforcement of the contract by another who relied on it to his detriment.
Klinke, 94 Wn. 2d at 259, 616 P.2d at 647.
33. For example, suppose that after extensive negotiations by telephone, A, who lives in New
York, accepts B's offer to move to Seattle and become B's exclusive sales representative for five
years. A quits his job and moves his entire family across the country, incurring considerable expense.
B, in the meantime, has decided to give the job to his son and notifies A, upon his arrival, that the
deal is off. B denies any contractual liability because the agreement was not in writing. WASH. REV.
CODE § 19.36.010(1) (1979) (every agreement which by its terms cannot be performed in one year
from its making must be in writing). Despite the contractual defense of the Statute of Frauds, the
equities are with A who was induced into relying on the promise. Moreover, A's reliance is not less
reasonable because of the absence of a secondary promise to make a writing. Under the Klinke rule,
however, unless a court is willing to find that B implicitly promised to put the agreement in writing,
A will be without relief. See, e.g., Boone v. Coe, 153 Ky. 233, 154 S.W. 900 (1913).
34. The court of appeals cited with approval McIntosh v. Murphy, 52 Hawaii 29, 469 P.2d 177
(1970), which stated:
It is appropriate for modem courts to cast aside the raiments of conceptualism which cloak the
true policies underlying the reasoning behind the many decisions enforcing contracts that violate
the Statute of Frauds. There is certainly no need to resort to legal rubrics or meticulous legal
formulas when better explanations are available....
Klinke, 24 Wn. App. at 213, 600 P.2d at 1041.
35. A court liberal in its interpretation of implicit promises could reach the same equitable result
that a court would under § 217A. Even so, the Klinke rule would be unsatisfactory. A court's inquiry
should be directed at the reasonableness of the promisee's reliance, not whether some formalistic
requirement has been satisfied.
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A. The Promise
The first prerequisite to promissory estoppel recovery is the promise. 36
A promise is an objective37 manifestation 38 of intention to act or to refrain
from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in under-
standing that a commitment has been made. 39 The promissory estoppel
doctrine does not, however, afford relief for an illusory promise. 40 A
promise is illusory if it is so indefinite that its meaning cannot be clearly
determined or if it contains provisions that make performance wholly
within the promisor's discretion.41
1. The Questionable Requirement of Definiteness
Promissory estoppel recovery will be denied if a court cannot identify
the promised performance with reasonable certainty. 42 The rationale is
that reliance on an indefinite promise cannot be reasonable. 43 This rule is
subject to criticism, however, because definiteness is unnecessary in the
promissory estoppel context. Reliance on an indefinite promise should
not be equated with unreasonable reliance and thus automatically fore-
close promissory estoppel relief.
For example, suppose A is promised a hamburger franchise by the
Jimbo Quickfry Burger Company of Topeka if he will knock down a
warehouse on his land and erect a hamburger facility. The parties do not
discuss the terms of the franchise agreement, merely Jimbo's assurance
36. Hill v. Corbett, 33 Wn. 2d 219, 222, 204 P.2d 845, 847 (1949). A promise is to be distin-
guished from an apparent jest, Barnes v. Treece, 15 Wn. App. 437, 440, 549 P.2d 1152, 1155
(1976); or a statement of intention, Meissner v. Simpson Timber Co., 69 Wn. 2d 949, 957, 421 P.2d
674, 679 (1966); 1 A. ConBIN, CoNTRAcrs § 15, at 32 (1963); or an opinion, Neth v. General Elec-
tric Co., 65 Wn. 2d 652, 658, 399 P.2d 314, 318 (1965); or a mere prediction of a future event,
RESTAmdET (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2, Comment f (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964).
37. The promisor's subjective intention is irrelevant. The only matter of significance is whether
the reasonable person in the position of the promisee would believe that the promise was in earnest.
See note 13 supra.
38. A promise may be expressed in words, oral or written, or inferred wholly or partly from the
conduct of the promisor. RTA lENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACS § 5 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964).
39. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 2 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964). The present Washing-
ton definition of a promise is "an undertaking, however expressed, either that something shall hap-
pen, or that something shall not happen in the future." Plumbing Shop, Inc. v. Pitts, 67 Wn. 2d 514,
517, 408 P.2d 382, 384 (1965) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF CoNTlACrS § 2 (1932)). The problem with
the First Restatement's definition is the semantic difficulty of the meaning of "undertaking." The
Second Restatement avoids this problem by emphasizing the corresponding effect of the promise on
the promisee. See Reporter's comments to RESTATEMENT (SEcom) OF CoNTRAcrs § 2 (Tent. Draft
No. 1, 1964).
40. IA A. CoRmiN, CoNTRAcTs § 201 (1963).
41. Spooner v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 47 Wn. 2d 454, 458,287 P.2d 735,738 (1955).
42. Id.
43. Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 343, 361
(1969).
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that the franchise will be lucrative. After A knocks down his building,
Jimbo awards the franchise to someone else. A's effort to recover on the
contract would be unsuccessful because the contract's terms are nonexis-
tent.44 On the other hand, promissory estoppel should be an available
theory of recovery. Despite the indefiniteness of the promise, A's reliance
may well have been reasonable because A was expected to rely on the
promise by knocking down his building before details of the agreement
were finalized. If a promisor expects the promisee to rely on the promise
at an early stage of negotiations, the indefiniteness of the promise itself
should not bar promissory estoppel recovery.
Definiteness is a contractual requirement 45 which is unnecessary in
promissory estoppel cases. A contract must be well-defined by the terms
of the promise, the acceptance, 46 or the subsequent performances 47 so
that a court may determine damages. 48 Contract damages attempt to put
the injured party in as good a position as he would have, obtained if the
contract had been performed. The remedy is defined by the promisee's
expectancy interest. In an action based upon promissory estoppel, how-
ever, the remedy is measured by the promisee's actual reliance on the
promise, and not his expectations. The promisee's reliance interest is as-
certainable regardless of the definiteness of the promise. 49
No Washington case has allowed promissory estoppel recovery for an
indefinite promise. A recognition that indefiniteness is not a complete de-
fense to an action based on promissory estoppel would put Washington in
line with well-reasoned authority. 50
44. Although a court will provide some missing terms, it will not write a contract for the parties.
I A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 95, at 398 (1963).
45. Sandeman v. Sayres, 50Wn. 2d539,541,314 P.2d 428,429(1957).
46. Acceptance of the offer can define the terms of the contract. For example, if A says to B, "I
promise to sell you as many widgets as you may require, up to 10,000" and B responds, "I promise
to buy 5000 widgets," the acceptance of A's offer has created an enforceable contract for 5000
widgets.
47. Platts v. Amey, 46 Wn. 2d 122, 126, 278 P.2d 657, 660 (1955).
48. [B]efore a proposal can ripen into a contract, upon the exercise of the power of acceptance
by the one to whom it is made, it must be definite enough so that when it is coupled with the
acceptance it can be determined, with at least a reasonable degree of certainty, what the nature
and extent of the obligation is which the proposer has assumed. Otherwise, no basis would exist
for determining liability.
Johnson v. Star Iron & Steel Co., 9 Wn. App. 202,206, 511 P.2d 1370, 1373-74 (1973).
49. See Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 343,
364(1969).
The analysis would be similar to having the terms of an indefinite contract clarified by the subse-
quent performances of the parties. See, e.g., Christoferson v. Radovich, 23 Wn. 2d 846, 162 P.2d
830 (1945)(the terms of an indefinite contract to construct a house were defined by the promisee's
actual construction). Instead of performance by the parties providing the contours of the agreement,
in the promissory estoppel situation reliance by the promisee defines the legal relationship between
the parties.
50. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1976);
Vol. 55:795, 1980
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2. Optional Performance
A promise is also illusory if performance is optional or entirely within
the discretion, pleasure, or control of the promisor. 51 A promisor obli-
gated to perform "only if he wants to" has not promised anything. 52 For
example, in Spooner v. Reserve Life Insurance Co.,53 the employer com-
pany "promised" to pay an incentive bonus for increased sales, but pro-
vided that the bonus might be discontinued without notice. Even though
plaintiff employees increased their sales in reliance on the company's
statements, the supreme court held that they could not recover the bonus.
The court decided that the company's statements were not promises
within the promissory estoppel doctrine, 54 because the company had ex-
pressly reserved its performance to its absolute discretion.
While Spooner is correct in theory, a court should be reluctant to con-
clude that a promisor reserved performance to his total discretion. If there
has been an expression to undertake some performance, the expression
falls within Washington's definition of a promise. The question then be-
comes one of definiteness, which should not automatically foreclose
promissory estoppel relief.55 Thus, if a promisor has agreed to some limi-
tation on his future freedom of action, then the promise is real and should
satisfy the promissory estoppel requirement.56
B. Foreseeability
Foreseeable reliance is the second prerequisite to promissory estoppel
recovery. 57 Foreseeability means that the promisor expects or should rea-
sonably expect58 the promisee to change his position in reliance on the
promise. The requirement of foreseeability shields a promisor from liabil-
Wheelerv. White, 398 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1965); J. CALmARi&J. PEiLo, CoNmAcrs § 6-10
(1977).
51. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACrS § 2, Comment e (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964).
52. An "illusory promise" is a purported promise that actually promises nothing because it
leaves to the speaker the choice of performance or nonperformance. When a "promise" is illu-
sory, there is no actual requirement upon the "promisor" that anything be done because the
"promisor" has an alternative which, if taken, will iender the "promisee" nothing.
Interchange Ass'n v. Interchange, Inc., 16 Wn. App. 359, 360,557 P.2d 357,358 (1976).
53. 47 Wn. 2d 454,287 P.2d 735 (1955).
54. Id. at 459,287 P.2d at 738.
55. See notes 42-50 and accompanying text supra.
56. The illusory promise problem has been greatly resolved in the last century. "The current
approach is to say that if the promisor can be taken to have agreed to any limitation on his future
freedom of action, however slight, then his promise is real and not illusory," G. GiLMORE, THE DEATH
oF CoNTPmTS 77 (1974).
57. Hill v. Corbett, 33 Wn. 2d 219,222, 204 P.2d 845, 847 (1949).
58. Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Requirements and Limitations of the Doctrine, 98 U. PA. L.
Rav. 459,461 (1950).
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ity for injury sustained by the promisee's unexpectable changes of posi-
tion.59 Unforeseeable reliance will not be protected.
The standard of foreseeability in Washington is a troublesome one.6°
For example, in Hill v. Corbett,61 a landlord gratuitously promised his
tenant an option to extend a lease on a garage for five years. In reliance on
that promise, the tenant sublet the garage to a third party for the term of
his lease and the extension. Before the tenant was able to accept the land-
lord's option, however, the landlord sold the garage and told the tenant
that the option was cancelled. The court denied the application of promis-
sory estoppel because the tenant did not establish that the landlord should
have reasonably expected the tenant to rely on the promised option. The
court came to this conclusion even though the landlord knew of the ten-
ant's plan to sublease the garage, and had his own attorney draft the op-
tion agreement. 62 It is hard to imagine what more would have been neces-
sary to establish foreseeability. Although the promisee's transaction with
the specific third party was not foreseeable, a transaction with some third
party was foreseeable.
The Hill court confused the question of foreseeability with the issue of
justifiable reliance. Although it was foreseeable that the tenant would
rely, his reliance may not have been justified. 63 The tenant wanted the
benefits of an option contract without giving consideration for it.64 He
wanted the power to rent the garage, but no obligation to lease it if he was
unable to find a sublessee. The promisee may have been guilty of
overreaching. 65
59. The requirement of foreseeability was established in Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156
Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). See generally, Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages:
1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 84-88 (1936).
60. Two cases have specifically denied the application of promissory estoppel because of unfore-
seen changes of position. Corbit v. J. I. Case Co., 70 Wn. 2d 522, 539, 424 P.2d 290, 301 (1967);
Hill v. Corbett, 33 Wn. 2d 219, 204 P.2d 845 (1949). J. I. Case involved a promisee who relied on a
conditional promise before the condition was satisfied. Instead of denying the application of the doc-
trine because of an unforeseeable change of position, the case would have been better analyzed as an
unjustified change of position, see notes 99-100 and accompanying text infra.
61. 33 Wn. 2d219,204 P.2d 845 (1941).
62. Id. at 223, 204 P.2d at 847-48.
63. A promisee is ordinarily not justified in relying on an offer. If he wishes to rely on the prom-
ise all he need do is accept it. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERiLLO, CONTRACTS § 6-9, at 212 (2d ed. 1977).
64. The Hill court did indicate that the promisee could have protected himself from harm by
accepting the offered option immediately. Hill v. Corbett, 33 Wn. 2d 219, 223, 204 P.2d 845, 848
(1949).
65. With the acceptance of the promissory estoppel doctrine in the bargain context, the holding
in Hill v. Corbett may be subject to attack. Modem contract doctrine recognizes that there are times
when reliance on an offer without immediate acceptance may be justified and foreseeable. The Re-
statement provides: "[a]n offer which the offeror should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance of a substantial character on the part of the offeree before acceptance and which does
induce such action or forbearance is binding as an option contract to the extent necessary to avoid
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The concept of foreseeable reliance should be distinguished from that
of justifiable reliance. 66 The test for foreseeability is-based upon all the
circumstances the promisor knew or should have known at the time of the
making of the promise, might it be expected that the promisee would rely?
The test for justifiable reliance, on the other hand is-based upon all the
circumstances objectively known to the promisee, was he reasonable in
relying on the promise?
Foreseeability sets the perimeter of reliance. All foreseeable reliance
by a promisee may be compensable. Whether a promisee will in fact re-
cover depends on whether his foreseeable reliance was also justifiable. If,
however, a promisee's reliance exceeded the foreseeability barrier, he
cannot recover for the excess reliance. For example, assume A promises
to pay for B's new car. B purchases a $95,000 Rolls Royce. Unless A had
reason to know that B intended to buy such an expensive car, B's reliance
would have exceeded the foreseeability barrier. B's potential recovery
could be no more than the cost of a car that A might have reasonably
foreseen B would buy.
C. Reliance
Reliance on the promise is the third prerequisite to promissory estoppel
recovery. 67 Reliance must be both substantial and induced by the promise
in order to satisfy this requirement.
1. Reliance on the Promise
The promisee must rely on the promise. 68 Although the promise need
not be the only factor that induces the promisee to rely, the promise must
play a major role in inducing the reliance. 69 A change of position before
injustice." REsTATEmEr (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 89B(2) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965); cf. WASH. REv.
CODE § 62A.2-205 (1979)(an offer made by a merchant to buy or sell goods, in a signed separate
writing, which gives assurances that it will be held open is not revocable for lack of consideration);
Ferrer v. Taft Structurals, Inc., 21 Wn. App. 832, 587 P.2d 177 (1978) (a general contractor can rely
on a bid submitted by a subcontractor in the estimation of his overall bid).
66. Granted, it would be difficult to find an instance where a promisee's reliance was reasonably
foreseeable and yet not reasonably justified. In fact, some formulations of the promissory estoppel
doctrine specify only the requirement of foreseeable reliance. See Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Re-
quirements and Limitations of the Doctrine, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 459, 460 (1950). Yet as the Washing-
ton formulation has both a requirement of foreseeable and of justifiable reliance, it must mean some-
thing. The term "justified" necessarily implies a qualitative decision, directing the court's attention
to the social acceptability of the promisee's reliance when balanced against the position of the promi-
sor.
67. Hill v. Corbett, 33 Wn. 2d 219,222,204 P.2d 845, 847 (1949).
68. State v. Northwest Magnesite Co., 28 Wn. 2d 1, 29, 182 P.2d 643,658 (1947).
69. In order for a promisee to rely, the promise must be communicated to the promisee. Hilton v.
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the promise was made70 or coincidental with the making of the promise
cannot have been induced by the promise, and therefore, does not meet
this test. 71
In Neth v. General Electric C0., 72 the Washington Supreme Court in
dictum indicated that not only must the promise cause the reliance, but
the reliance must also have been requested, expressly or impliedly, by the
promisor. In Neth, defendant, in an effort to stop union organization of its
secretarial department, printed pamphlets arguing that the employees al-
ready enjoyed all union benefits. After plaintiff, a clerical worker, was
discharged, she demanded the union right to have the discharge reviewed
by a neutral arbitrator. The court stated that even if defendant's expres-
sions were an actionable promise, 73 promissory estoppel relief would still
be denied because she had not adequately relied on her employer's repre-
sentations:
It should be noted that, in order for [plaintiff] to have relied on these so-
called "promises" or "representations," her act in reliance thereon would
have to be more than a mere continuation in her employment with the em-
ployer. . . . [T]he act must be the one sought or requested by the em-
ployer. 74
The court's analysis of the promissory estoppel doctrine's reliance re-
quirement was flawed. Reliance, for estoppel purposes, is the result of the
promise, not the inducement for the promise. 75 To argue otherwise is to
confuse promises supported by consideration with promises supported by
promissory estoppel. This confusion defeats one of the purposes of prom-
issory estoppel, which is to provide relief even when consideration is
lacking.76
2. Substantial Change of Position
Not only must the promisee rely on the promise, but the action or
forbearance must amount to a substantial change of position.77 There is
Alexander& Baldwin, Inc., 66 Wn. 2d 30, 31, 400 P.2d 772,774 (1965).
70. For example, if A says to B, "I promise to reimburse you for that new car you bought," and
B does nothing else but expect performance, then B has not relied on the promise.
71. See Northern State Construction Co. v. Robbins, 76 Wn. 2d 357, 457 P.2d 187 (1969)(a
promisee does not rely on a promise if the change of position is only what he is contractually obli-
gated to do) discussed at notes 86-91 and accompanying text infra.
72. 65 Wn. 2d 652, 399 P.2d 314 (1965).
73. The court found the defendant's representations to be expressions of opinion, and not real
promises. Id. at 658, 399 P.2d at 318.
74. Id. at 659,399 P.2d at 319.
75. IA A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 196, at 199 (1963).
76. See notes 18-23 and accompanying text supra.
77. State v. Northwest Magnesite Co., 28 Wn. 2d 1, 29, 182 P.2d 643, 658 (1947); IA A.
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no precise measure of substantiality, a fluid concept dependent upon the
individual circumstances. 78
There is, however, Washington case authority for the proposition that
forbearance from action by the promisee cannot be substantial reliance. 79
Logic does not support a distinction between action and forbearance from
action.80 In either situation the promisee has sustained foreseeable injury
because of the promisor's promise. Yet the court in Hazlett v. First Fed-
eral Savings & Loan Association8l denied relief to a promisee who re-
frained from obtaining fire insurance on his property iii reliance on the
promisor's promise to procure the insurance. The court concluded,
"Surely, forbearance was not intended to include the mere passive failure
of the promisee to procure elsewhere, or by other means, the service or
the thing promised." 8 2
This action/forbearance distinction may have been overruled sub silen-
tio in Weitman v. Grange Insurance Association.8 3 In Weitman, defen-
dant promised to notify the plaintiff if plaintiff's insurance policy on his
feed mill lapsed or was to be terminated. In reliance on the promise,
plaintiff forbore obtaining insurance available elsewhere. The court af-
firmed promissory estoppel recovery without discussing the problems of
forbearance or any of the Hazlett exceptions. 84 Thus, the Washington
CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 200, at 215 (1963).
78. Of course, in every case the question will arise, what is substantial. It cannot be answered
by a formula. It is a matter of fact, to be determined by court and jury, under appellate supervi-
sion as in other cases. Not only is it a matter of fact; it has no absolute standard of measurement.
Beyond doubt, it is relative to the other circumstances and especially to the content of the prom-
ise and the cost to the promisor of his promised performance.
1A A. CoRaN, CoNTRACrS § 200, at 215-16 (1963).
79. See Hudson v. Ellsworth, 56 Wash. 243, 105 P. 463 (1909); Hazlett v. First Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 14 Wn. 2d 124, 127 P.2d 273 (1942).
80. Commenting on the distinction in Washington between action and forbearance, Professor
Shattuck wrote:
That the draftsmen of section 90 had any such distinction in mind seems most unlikely. The
creation of categories of non-action, only some of which are sufficient reliance, is a process hard
indeed to justify on any logical basis. This is a holding which may be vulnerable to attack in
future litigation.
Shattuck, Contracts in Washington, 1937-1957, 34 WasH. L. REv. 24, 71 (1959). See Boyer, Prom-
issory Estoppel: Requirements and Limitations of the Doctrine, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 459, 479-82
(1950).
81. 14Wn.2d 124, 127 P.2d273 (1942).
82. Id. at 131, 127P.2dat277.
83. 59 Wn. 2d 748,370 P.2d 587 (1962).
84. In dictum, the Hazlett court recognized an exception to the rule that forbearance is insuffi-
cient reliance if the promisor had begun performance or if the promisor was an insurance agent or a
factor or a broker. 14 Wn. 2d at 130, 127 P'2d at 276 (citing Hudson v. Ellsworth, 56 Wash. 243,
247, 105 P. 463, 465 (1909)). The promisor in Weitman, being an insurance agent, fit within the
second exception. However, because the Weitman court ignored the forbearance issue, two Washing-
ton court of appeals decisions and one Ninth Circuit opinion have assumed that the distinction be-
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court has impliedly recognized that substantial forbearance can be sub-
stantial reliance. 85
The Washington Supreme Court has held that doing what one is al-
ready legally bound to do is not substantial reliance. 86 In Northern State
Construction Co. v. Robbins,87 a corporation entered into a contract with
plaintiff construction company to build a concession stand at the Seattle
World's Fair. Three days after the contract was signed, defendants, back-
ers of the corporation, signed a guarantee, personally promising to pay
plaintiff if the corporation was unable to meet its obligations. The guaran-
tee was not supported by consideration. After plaintiff had completed his
performance, the corporation became insolvent. Regarding plaintiff's
reliance on the guarantee, the court found that "[a]ll that plaintiff did was
continue with the construction which it was bound to do by the terms of
the contract. "88 The court concluded that the plaintiff did not, therefore,
substantially rely on the promised guarantee. 89
If, however, plaintiff had incurred additional damages as a result of his
reliance, then the legal duty of performance would not preclude establish-
ing that plaintiff substantially relied on the promise. What is necessary is
a detrimental change of position over and above the contractual obliga-
tion. 90 For example, if in reliance upon defendant's guarantee of pay-
ment, plaintiff lost his right to a materialman's lien, this reliance interest
tween action and forbearance has been eliminated. See Broxson v. Chicago, M. St. P. & Pac. R.R.
Co., 446 F.2d 628 (9th Cir. 1971) (forbearance from repairing an elevator); Estes v. Hammerstad,
Inc., 8 Wn. App. 22, 24-25 n. 1, 503 P.2d 1149, 1151 n. 1 (1972) (forbearance from obtaining insur-
ance); Hellbaum v. Burwell and Morford, 1 Wn. App. 694, 701 n.3, 463 P.2d 225, 229 n.3 (1969).
85. On the issue of gratuitous promises to procure insurance, see generally RESTATMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACrS § 90, Comment f (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965).
86. Northern State Const. Co. v. Robbins, 76 Wn. 2d 357, 457 P.2d 187 (1969). But see Luther
v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 2 Wn. 2d 470, 98 P.2d 667 (1940) (promise by a wife to care for her
husband, although a legal duty, was nevertheless recognized as substantial reliance for his promise to
convey his estate upon death to her); Douglas County Memorial Hosp. Ass'n v. Newby, 45 Wn. 2d
784, 278 P.2d 330 (1954), discussed at note 89 infra.
87. 76 Wn. 2d 357, 457 P.2d 187 (1969).
88. Id. at 362,457 P.2d at 190.
89. Id. Northern State Construction is contrary to the earlier Washington decision of Douglas
County Memorial Hosp. Ass'n v. Newby, 45 Wn. 2d 784, 278 P.2d 330 (1954). In Newby, defen-
dant, owing the hospital several hundred dollars, promised to pay the debt at a rate of twenty dollars a
month. Plaintiff agreed to accept the twenty dollars a month, although the full amount was then
owing. When plaintiff sought to disregard the agreement and compel Newby to pay the full amount
owing, the court allowed defendant to assert promissory estoppel, despite the fact that defendant
owed a legal duty to pay. As Newby has not been cited as authority since the decision was rendered, it
is believed the case is limited to its facts.
90. The principle is similar to that found in the doctrine of consideration. A promise to do some-
thing that one is already contractually obligated to do is not sufficient consideration to support a new
promise, Johnson v. Tanner, 59 Wn. 2d 606, 609, 369 P.2d 307, 309 (1961), yet there is considera-
tion for the promising or doing of something additional to what was required in the initial contract,
Gannon v. Emtman, 66 Wn. 2d 755, 760, 405 P.2d 254, 257 (1965). Just as additional promises or
808
Vol. 55:795, 1980
Promissory Estoppel
should be protected by promissory estoppel. Thus, if a promisee reason-
ably relied on a promise in such a way that he has incurred injury he
would not have sustained if the promise had not been made, then promis-
sory estoppel would provide a theory of recovery. 91
D. Justifiable Reliance
Justifiable reliance is the fourth prerequisite to promissory estoppel re-
covery. 92 Like foreseeability, justifiable reliance is measured by an objec-
tive standard. The test is whether a reasonable promisee, in the same or
similar circumstances, would have relied on the promise.
1. The Issue of Justifiable Reliance
Justifiable reliance is nothing less than a policy choice. 93 When should
the law provide a remedy for reliance without a contract? The choice is
between protecting the relying promisee, to whom it appeared that the
performances are sufficient consideration to support a contract, so too should additional reliance be
sufficient to support an action under the promissory estoppel doctrine.
91. Promissory estoppel will not protect a promisee who does no more than perform his original
obligation. The doctrine will only protect a promisee who modifies his performance because of the
promise and is injured because of his reliance. Relief will be granted only to the extent of reliance.
For example, suppose A and B enter into a contract whereby A promises to repair B's roof for
$1,000. After completing about half of the job, A discovers the work will cost him significantly more
than he had originally estimated. He negotiates with B who then promises an additional $250. In
reliance on the promise A purchases an additional $250 worth of supplies which he would not have
purchased if B had not made the promise. Despite the holding in Rosellini v. Banchero, 83 Wn. 2d
268, 517 P.2d 955 (1974), that new consideration is necessary to provide a modification to an execu-
tory contract, A should be able to assert promissory estoppel and recover the additional $250. See
RESTATeMNr (SECOND) OF COTRAMcrs § 89D(c) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965). Note that the Rosellini
decision is contrary to REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CoNnAcrs § 89D(a) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965) and
the U.C.C. § 2-209 (1972 version)(sales contracts).
92. Hill v. Corbett, 33 Wn. 2d 219, 222-23,204 P.2d 845, 847-48 (1949). Only two Washing-
ton decisions have directly addressed the issue of justifiable reliance, but neither case provides much
insight into its specific requirements. In Hilton v. Alexander & Baldwin, Inc., 66 Wn. 2d 30, 400
P.2d 772 (1965), the court held that in order for a promisee to justifiably rely on a promise, the
promise must have been communicated to him. Id. at 31, 400 P.2d at 774. Yet, the requirement of
communication is inherent in the element of reliance, and is separate from the issue of justifiable
reliance. See notes 68-71 and accompanying text supra. In Weitman v. Grange Ins. Ass'n, 59 Wn.
2d 748, 370 P.2d 587 (1962), a rule was announced that reliance upon the promise of another to
provide information was justifiable only if the promisee was not only destitute of knowledge of the
state of facts, but was also destitute of any convenient and available means of acquiring the informa-
tion. Id. at 752, 370 P.2d at 589. The court's rule, however, does not apply to the promissory estop-
pel doctrine where reliance on promises rather than facts is the gravamen. In fact, the rule in Weitman
was taken from the equitable estoppel case of Geoghegan v. Dever, 30 Wn. 2d 877, 194 P.2d 397
(1948), and should be limited to the equiptable estoppel situations.
93. Note the emphasis on justice and fairness in the application of the promissory estoppel doc-
trine. "[Promissory estoppel] is an attempt by the courts to keep remedies abreast of increased moral
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promisor intended to perform, or protecting the promisor, who has not
contractually obligated himself. For example, suppose A promises to pay
for B's trip to Europe. In reliance on the promise B takes the trip. A's
promise to make a gift is not a contract. After considering, however, such
factors as the sincerity of the promise, the setting in which it was made,
A's knowledge of B's willingness to take the trip, and the relationship
between the parties, then B's reliance may have been reasonable. If so,
the loss should fall on the promisor who reneged, not on the innocent
promisee.
The equities of the case will often determine whether reliance was
justifiable. Faced with the choice between a relatively innocent promisee
and a manipulative promisor, a natural sense of justice dictates protecting
the innocent promisee even though no contract was formed. 94 This
equity-minded analysis is inherent in promissory estoppel. The purpose
of the doctrine is to remedy injustice.95 Thus, unless the equities of the
case favor the promisee, a court is unlikely to conclude that the promisee
justifiably relied.
2. Justifiable Reliance as a Limitation on Recovery
The requirement that the promisee prove that his reliance was justifi-
able is the promisor's greatest protection from liability. The promisor
can, therefore, reduce or avoid responsibility for injuries to the promisee
by revoking or conditioning the promise. 96
consciousness of honesty and fair representations in all business dealings." Peoples Nat'l Bank of
Little Rock v. Linebarger Constr. Co., 219 Ark. 11, 17, 240 S.W.2d 12, 16 (1951). "We conclude
that injustice would result here if plaintiffs were not granted some relief because of the failure of
defendants to keep their promises which induced plaintiffs to act to their detriment." Hoffman v. Red
Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267, 275 (1965)(emphasis added). "It seems to us
that it would be a gross injustice to deny respondent [relief] . . .merely because by operation of the
law the services which she rendered subsequent to marriage are held to be without consideration."
Luther v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 2 Wn. 2d 470,484, 98 P.2d 667, 673 (1940)(emphasis added).
The doctrine itself can be applied only to prevent injustice. See RESTATEmENT OF CONRACTS § 90
(1932).
94. "[lI]t must be realized that the emphasis which the Restatement places on the avoidance of
injustice calls for the use of ethical standards in applying the doctrine of promissory estoppel."
Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Requirements and Limitations of the Doctrine, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 459,
484(1950).
95. See text accompanying notes 101-33 infra.
96. A third limitation on justifiable reliance suggested by one commentator is in the area of reli-
ance by third parties. Professor Boyer writes: "Promises are not made to the whole world, they are
directed to specific individuals. . . .To hold a promisor because third parties have or may have
changed position in reliance on his promise runs counter to the general trend of promissory obliga-
tions." Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Requirements and Limitations of the Doctrine, 98 U. PA. L.
REv. 459, 465 (1950). This position has been criticized. See 30 U. Prrr. L. REV. 174 (1968). The
present Restatement takes the position that enforcement of promises made for the benefit of third
parties rests on the same basis as in cases of reliance by the promisee. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
810
Vol. 55:795, 1980
Promissory Estoppel
If the promisee knows the promisor no longer intends to perform, he is
not justified in beginning or continuing to rely on the earlier promise. 97
For example, A promises to pay for B's college education. The next day,
before B has changed his position, A revokes the promise. If B later in-
curs expenses for tuition or books, then he cannot recover fr6m A. B's
reliance after A revokes his promise is not justified.
The effectiveness of the revocation is problematic once the promisee
has begun to rely on the promise. Assume that after A promises to pay for
B's college education, B enrolls in a four year institution. The issue is
whether B may continue to attend college all four years and recover his
total expenses, or whether he may recover only for the expenses he has
already incurred. Recovery for B should be limited to those expenses in-
curred prior to revocation of the promise by A. Once A revokes the prom-
ise, B is put on notice that any reliance beyond that point is unjustified. A
duty to mitigate harm, analogous to the contractual duty to mitigate losses
upon breach of a contract, should apply. 98 To allow the promisee to re-
cover for reliance after revobation of the promise would be to allow re-
covery of avoidable damages.
Another means for the promisor to protect himself from liability is
through the use of conditions. 99 The promisor is the master of his promise
and may impose any condition precedent to his obligation to perform. For
example, suppose A says to B, "I promise to give you $100 if I get a raise
next month." Performance of the promise becomes due only if A gets the
raise, the condition being satisfied. 100
CoNTRAcrs'§ 90, Comment d (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965). There is no Washington case authority on
the issue.
97. See Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Requirements and Limitations of the Doctrine, 98 U. PA.
L. REv. 459, 466-70 (1950).
98. There is a duty incumbent upon anyone who has suffered wrong at the hands of another to
make a reasonable effort to mitigate damages. Westland Const. Co. v. Chris Begg, Inc., 35 Wn. 2d
824, 837, 215 P.2d 683,691 (1950).
99. See Corbit v. J. I. Case Co., 70 Wn. 2d 522, 539, 424 P.2d 290, 301 (1967) which adopted
the rule that "[i]f a promise within [the doctrine of promissory estoppel] is in terms conditional or
performable at a future time the promisor is bound thereby, but performance becomes due only upon
the happening of the condition or upon the arrival of the specified time." (quoting RESTATEmENT OF
CoNmacrs § 91 (1932)).
100. In Winslow v. Mell, 48 Wn. 2d 581, 295 P.2d 319 (1956), the Washington court found a
conditional promise to be illusory. Defendant promised the logging rights to a certain piece of prop-
erty to plaintiff if defendant ever acquired the property. Since defendant was under no duty to pur-
chase the property, the promise was held illusory. Such a conclusion, howejer, was inappropriate.
Defendant, although not obligated to purchase the land, was presently obligated to the plaintiff if he
should ever acquire the land. He had promised away his right to assign the logging rights to someone
else. See RsrATeMAENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTrccrs § 2, Comment e (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964).
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E. Prevention of Injustice
A showing that injustice can be avoided only by full or partial perform-
ance of the promise is the final prerequisite to promissory estoppel recov-
ery. 101 The question of the amount of recovery should not be confused
with the right to recover. That is, enforcement of the promise need not
entail granting specific performance or providing damages based on the
promisee's expectations. 102 Rather, after deciding that the promisee
should recover, the inquiry is what in the particular case would be just
relief. 103
In an attempt to find the most appropriate measure of recovery under
the promissory estoppel doctrine, courts should distinguish a gratuitous
promise 04 from a promise made in the context of bargaining.1 05 Relief
for reliance on a gratuitous promise should be a return of reliance expen-
ditures limited by the promisee's expectancy interest. In the bargain con-
text, although reliance recovery will ordinarily be the most suitable mea-
sure of damages, expectancy relief is sometimes appropriate. 106
101. Hill v. Corbett, 33 Wn. 2d 219, 223,204 P.2d 845, 847 (1949).
102. IA A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 205, at 236 (1963).
103. Few Washington promissory estoppel decisions have ever reached the issue of the appropri-
ate measure of relief under promissory estoppel theory. Those that have provided relief have split
between reliance and expectancy recovery. See Central Heat, Inc. v. Daily Olympian, Inc., 74 Wn.
2d 126, 443 P.2d 544 (1968) (expectancy recovery, but not a true promissory estoppel decision, see
note 23 supra); Luther v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 2 Wn. 2d 470, 98 P.2d 667 (1940) (expectancy
recovery, but as a contract was actually formed, Luther is questionable authority on promissory es-
toppel); Estes v. Hammerstad, Inc., 8 Wn. App. 22, 503 P.2d 1141 (1972) (reliance recovery); Hell-
baum v. Burwell and Morford, I Wn. App. 694, 463 P.2d 225 (1969) (reliance relief). See also
Heaton v. Imus, 93 Wn. 2d 249, 608 P.2d 631 (1980) (providing expectancy relief for reliance with-
out a contract under a heretofore unknown theory of quasi contract quantum meruit).
104. Most early discussions of the measure of relief under promissory estoppel theory concerned
only gratuitous promises. See, e.g., Seavey, Reliance upon Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct.
64 HARv. L. REV. 913 (1951); Shattuck, Gratuitous Promises-A New Writ?, 35 MICH. L. REv. 908
(1937); Comment, The Measure of Damages for Breach of a Contract Created by Action in Reliance,
48 YALE L.J. 1036 (1939). As such, they are of questionable authority for use in arriving at a measure
of relief for reliance on a promise made in the bargain context. See Comment, Once More into the
Breach: Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Damage Doctrine, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 559 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Into The Breach].
105. Promissory estoppel was originally available only for reliance on gratuitous promises. See
Shattuck, Gratuitous Promises-A New Writ?, 35 MICH. L. REv. 908, 909 (1937); Boyer, Promis-
sory Estoppel: Principle from Precedents, 50 MIcH. L. REv. 639, 643 (1952). If the parties were
contemplating a contract in the bargain context, the promisee was regarded as having assumed the
risk of his reliance if no contract was ultimately formed. See, e.g., James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros.,
Inc., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933). The last twenty years have seen the application of promissory
estoppel to the bargain context. Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine,
78 YALE L.J. 343,344 (1969).
106. The measureof recovery in the promissory estoppel context is the choice between providing
the promisee with his reliance interest or his expectancy interest. Limiting recovery to the restitution-
ary interest will ordinarily not protect the promisee. For example, suppose A promises to hire B for
three years as foreman of his shipping dock. B spends $500 in plane fare and other reasonable ex-
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1. Reliance on Gratuitous Promises
If the parties are not contemplating the creation of a contract, then a
promisee who relies on a gratuitous promise is not entitled to expectancy
relief. 107 Recovery should be reliance expenditures limited by the promi-
see's expectancy interest.108 Ordinarily, relief would be a return of the
expenses incurred in reliance on the promise. 109 Once the reliance expen-
ditures exceed the expectancy interest, however, the promisee would be
limited to the lesser expectancy recovery. 110
To illustrate the application of reliance limited by expectancy damages,
suppose an uncle promises his nephew $1,000. The nephew, unbe-
knownst to the uncle, decides to go into business. Reserving the promised
$1,000 for rent, he invests his savings in a weasel ranch. At the end of the
month when the landlord demands payment, the nephew asks his uncle
for the money. The uncle, however, has decided not to make the gift. The
nephew is forced to liquidate the weasel ranch to pay his debts and loses
$2,000.
The nephew has suffered $2,000 in losses, but should be entitled to
recover only $1,000. His expectancy interest ($1,000) would limit his
penses, and reports to the shipping dock on Monday morning. A, however, has decided not to give
the job to B and tells him there is no contract as agreements that cannot be performed within one year
violate the Statute of Frauds. See note 24 supra. Assuming that the Statute of Frauds is no bar to the
assertion of promissory estoppel, see notes 24-29 and accompanying text supra, appropriate relief is
either providing a reliance recovery (the $500 spent in reasonable reliance on the promise) or an
expectancy recovery (which will be determined at trial, whatever lost profits the promisee would have
had had the promisor performed). As this hypothetical illustrates, however, a restitutionary recovery
would be inappropriate. As recovery is based upon disgorging unjust enrichment from the promisor,
the promisor in this, and most other promissory estoppel situations, has received little or no benefit
from the promisee's actions in reliance. There is nothing to disgorge.
107. A promisee who relies on a promise to make a gift has no right to expectancy recovery
because a promisee has no right to a gift. See Shattuck, supra note 7, at 943-44. The focus of the
doctrine should be upon the prevention of harm, not giving a promisee a windfall, as would be the
result with an expectancy recovery. Providing reliance recovery for a promisee who relies on a gratui-
tous promise will place the promisee in as good a position as she was before she relied on the prom-
ise. See note 4 supra.
108. Seavey, Reliance upon Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, 64 HARv. L. REv. 913, 926
(195 1) (note, however, the emphasis on tort principles); Shattuck, supra note 7, at 942-43.
109. There are times, however, when a court will not concern itself with the actual reliance of the
promisee, but will presume for social policy reasons that the promisee relied up to his expectancy
interest. Two examples of this policy decision are charitable subscriptions and marriage settlements.
See RESTATM3T (SEcoND) OF Co~rnrAcrs § 90(2) (Tent. Draft Nos. 1-7, 1973); see also note 11
supra.
110. Reliance recovery seeks to return the promisee to the position he occupied before his reli-
ance on the promise. See note 4 supra. Note, however, that a promisee who attains benefits from his
reliance is not returned to his pre-promise position. For example, if A promises to pay for B's car and
B spends $500 in reliance on the promise to buy a car, a $500 recovery will not place B in his pre-
promise position because he still retains the car. Appropriate reliance recovery would be $500 less
what B could recover for selling the car.
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reliance interest ($2,000) recovery, for he had reason to expect only the
promised $ 1,000.111 A promisee who relies beyond his expectancy inter-
est has assumed the risk of additional loss. 112
2. Reliance in the Bargain Context
The argument for expectancy recovery is much stronger in the bargain
context. 1 13 The bargaining parties contemplate the formation of a contract
from which they expect to profit. Notwithstanding the parties' expectan-
cies, reliance recovery is still the appropriate measure of relief in most
commercial situations. 1 14
When parties bargain for performances, they may fail to form a con-
tract for one of three reasons. Either consideration 15 or mutual assent, 1 6
may be missing, or the contract may violate the Statute of Frauds." 17
These three impediments to contract formation have been translated into
three situations inviting the application of promissory estoppel in the bar-
gain context. Each pattern should be separately analyzed.
111. Another illustration of reliance limited by expectancy is in a promise to convey land. In
Raymond v. Hattrick, 104 Wash. 619, 177 P. 640 (1919), defendant promised to convey a piece of
property to plaintiff. In reliance on the promise, plaintiff erected a "substantial residence" on the
property. When defendant later refused to convey the deed, plaintiff was awarded specific perform-
ance. Yet in another promise to convey land case, Mitchell v. Pirire, 38 Wash. 691, 80 P. 774
(1905), a family who moved from Massachusetts to Washington in reliance on the promise was de-
nied all relief.
A more satisfactory result would be obtained using reliance limited by expectancy rather than an all
or nothing approach. If the promisee's reliance expenditures were less than the value of the land, he
should be limited to reliance relief. With a return of his reliance expenditures, a promisee is no worse
off than when the promise was made. If, however, the reliance on the promise exceeds the value of
the land, then specific performance or a like sum in damages would be in order.
112. Recognizing that sometimes it may be difficult to actually measure the reliance interest of
the promisee, Professor Eisenberg sets forth a rule for measuring nonfinancial reliances. "Broadly
speaking, expectation should be employed as a surrogate for measuring the costs of reliance only if
those costs appear significant, difficult to quantify, and closely related to the full extent of the prom-
ise. An important index for determining whether this test has been met is whether the promisee was
induced to make a substantial change in his life that is not easily reversible." Eisenberg, Donative
Promises, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 1,29 (1980).
113. See, Into the Breach, supra note 104, at 565-80. Two reasons have been identified for the
enforcement of expectancies. They are: (1) expectancy recovery most closely resembles the actual
commercial harm that has befallen the promisee, and (2) providing expectancy recovery facilitates
reliance on business agreements. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 4, at 62.
114. Reliance recovery is not antithetical to expectancy-like relief. Included within the reliance
interest is not only the promisee's out-of-pocket expenses but the gains prevented by reliance on the
promise. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 4, at 55. Had the promisee not been induced into relying on the
promise, he might have entered into another contract from which he would have received profits.
Such recovery is ordinarily, however, too speculative for a court to provide.
115. See notes 12-16 and accompanying text supra.
116. See notes 17-23 and accompanying text supra.
117. See notes 24-29 and accompanying text supra.
Promissory Estoppel
The first situation is when a promisee relies on a promise that is not
supported by consideration. These are known as the firm offer cases.118
For example, assume a subcontractor submits an offer 19 to do a paving
project for $1,000. The general contractor relies on the subcontractor's
offer and incorporates it into his bid. After the general contractor has been
awarded the contract and is obligated to perform, but before he has ac-
cepted the subcontractor's offer, the subcontractor revokes his offer. The
general contractor then accepts the next lowest offer, $1,500. The general
contractor may sue the subcontractor on a promissory estoppel theory.
Recovery for reliance on an offer should be limited to the promisee's
reliance expenditures. An offeror ordinarily has the power to revoke his
offer until acceptance, without incurring liability. 120 Reasonable reliance
on an offer is an exception to this rule. 121 Reliance recovery prevents the
promisee from being harmed for his reliance, yet does not unduly penal-
ize the promiser. The promisee in the illustration above should be limited
to a $500 recovery, his reliance interest. 122
The second application of promissory estoppel in a bargaining context
occurs when a contract is not formed because of the parties' lack of mu-
tual assent. These are the indefinite promise cases.123 As in the firm offer
118. See Into the Breach, supra note 104, at 582, RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrTS § 89
(Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965); See, e.g., Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757
(1958); cf. Ferrer v. Taft Structurals, Inc., 21 Wn. App. 832, 587 P.2d 177 (1978). In Ferrer, sub-
contractor submitted a bid which the general contractor incorporated into his overall estimate. Unlike
other firm offer cases, however, the general contractor awarded the project to the subcontractor be-
fore the subcontractor withdrew his bid, thus accepting his offer. Although the court of appeals
accepted the principle of reliance on an offer, the conclusion was simply not called for. This was a
contract and not a promissory estoppel case.
119. A bid is no more than an offer to contract. Clover Park School Dist. No. 400 v. Consoli-
dated Dairy Products Co., 15 Wn. App. 429, 433,550 P.2d 47, 49 (1976).
120. 1 S. WMLISTON, CoNTRAcrs § 55, at 176 (3d ed. 1957); 1 A. CORBN, CoNT Acrs § 38, at
157(1963).
121. Relief for reliance on an offer is an extension of the promisor's liability. Although a promi-
see ordinarily is not justified in relying on an offer, see note 63 supra, there are times when such
reliance is reasonable. See Ferrer v. Taft Structurals, Inc., 21 Wn. App. 832, 835, 587 P.2d 177, 178
(1978). The remedy granted in these situations, however, must take into account that this is an exten-
sion of liability. Benefit from this extension runs only to the promisee. A promisee is not liable to a
promisor for reliance on an offer. Milone & Tucci, Inc. v. Bona Fide Builders, Inc., 49 Wn. 2d 363,
301 P.2d 759 (1956)(mere use of subcontractor's bid did not constitute an acceptance of the offer);
Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Gunderson Bros. Engineering Corp., 305 F.2d 659 (9th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 935 (1962) (under Washington law use of a subcontractor's bid is not
an acceptance). It is difficult to justify the additional liability of expectancy recovery to an already
overburdened promisor.
122. The promisee incurred an additional $500 expense in reliance on the promise. But see, Into
the Breach, supra note 104, at 570, where it is argued that similar recovery is expectancy relief.
123. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W. 2d 267 (1965);
Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1965). A surprising number of the indefinite prom-
ise cases arise in the franchise context. Therefore, special attention should be given to the registration
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cases, the appropriate measure of damages is the promisee's reliance
expenditures. There are two reasons why this measure of damages is
proper. First, expectancy recovery would be exceedingly speculative. Ex-
pectancy recovery attempts to give the promisee the benefit of the prom-
ised performance. The very problem in the indefinite promise situation is
that this benefit is uncertain. 124 Second, as a court has already determined
that the agreement is too indefinite to be enforced, it would be incongru-
ous to find that bare reliance on the promise could create, without more, a
right to expectancy relief.
The third application of the doctrine occurs when the promisee relies
on a contract that violates the Statute of Frauds. 125 In these cases, expec-
tancy recovery may logically be granted. 126 Unlike the other two situa-
tions, providing expectancy relief does not contravene the purpose of the
restriction on contract formation. 127 "The purpose of the Statute of
Frauds is the prevention of frauds arising from the uncertainty inherent in
oral, contractual undertakings." 128 However, "[where no uncertainty
exists in the oral agreement, the reason for the statute's application simi-
larly disappears." 129 The proof sufficient to establish promissory estoppel
may serve as an evidentiary substitute for the writing requirement of the
statute, allowing the promisee to recover on the contract. As in the doc-
trine of part performance, 130 if a promisee can prove clearly and unequi-
requirements of the Washington Franchise Investment Protection Act, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.100.-
010-.940 (1979). The Act required franchisors to file information concerning the terms of the
franchise. Failure to comply may give a promisee an action for damages.
124. "If, unless uncontestably proven, such profits are thought too 'speculative' to constitute an
element of recovery in normal contract actions, the same limiting rule could be expected to operate
with no less force where reliance forms the basis for enforcement." Into the Breach, supra note 104,
at 586-8.
125. See, e.g., Klinke v. Famous Recipe Fried Chicken, Inc. 94 Wn. 2d 255, 616 P.2d 644
(1980); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Stephenson, 217 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1954).
126. The vast majority of decisions that have addressed the issue of the measure of recovery
under promissory estoppel theory for reliance on a contract that violates the Statute of Frauds have
granted expectancy relief. See, e.g., Lucas v. Whittaker Corp., 470 F.2d 326 (10th Cir. 1972);
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Stephenson, 217 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1954). See Note, Promissory Estoppel as
a Means ofDefeating the Statute of Frauds, 44 FORD. L. REV. 114, 123 (1975).
127. In both the firm offer and indefinite promise cases, an essential element to contract forma-
tion is missing. Without consideration or mutual assent, a contract has not been formed. In the Statute
of Frauds cases, however, the statute serves only as a defense to an otherwise valid contract. Thus,
once the defense is removed, recovery should be had on the contract, and not on the separate theory
of promissory estoppel.
128. Miller v. McCamish, 78 Wn. 2d 821, 829, 479 P.2d 919,924 (1971).
129. Id.
130. Part performance is an equitable doctrine having as its purpose the prevention of fraud that
would occur if a promisor were allowed to escape performance of his contract after the promisee has
changed his position in performance of his agreement. See Richardson v. Taylor Land and Livestock
Co., 25 Wn. 2d 518, 527, 171 P.2d 703, 709 (1946). The purpose of the doctrine is almost identical
to that of promissory estoppel. In fact, a court could, through a broad reading of the word "perform-
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vocally the contract's terms and character, and if his reliance unmistak-
ably points to the existence of the agreement, and if the promisor
promises explicitly or implicitly to put the promise in writing,131 then ex-
pectancy recovery should be granted. 132 If, however, the promisee is un-
able to meet the necessary proof requirements in order to recover his ex-
pectancies, but can nonetheless establish the other elements of the
promissory estoppel doctrine, then reliance recovery would be appropri-
ate. 133
CONCLUSION
Promissory estoppel provides a promisee with an alternative theory of
recovery if a contract action would fail for want of mutual assent or con-
sideration, or if the contract violates the Statute of Frauds. Since these are
not infrequent occurrences, a promisee who forseeably and justifiably re-
lied on a promisee should always assert promissory estoppel as an alterna-
tive theory of recovery when the existence of a contract is at issue.
Joseph D. Weinstein
ance," provide the same protection to a promisee under the part performance doctrine. Unfortu-
nately, courts have a tendency to read performance restrictively. See, e.g., Wagers v. Associated
Mortgage Investors, 19 Wn. App. 758, 577 P.2d 622 (1978); Sunset Pac. Oil Co. v. Clark, 171
Wash. 165, 17 P.2d 879 (1933), and there is authority for the proposition that the doctrine applies
only to contracts involving real estate. Id. The promissory estoppel requirement of reliance is much
broader than "performance" and could logically incorporate the part performance cases. Nonethe-
less, a court determined to invalidate an agreement because of the Statute of Frauds could reach the
same result under promissory estoppel theory by a restrictive interpretation of the requirement of
substantiality. See notes 77-91 and accompanying text supra.
131. Klinke v. Famous Recipe Fried Chicken, Inc., 94 Wn. 2d 255, 259, 616 P.2d 644, 647
(1980). See notes 24-35 and accompanying text supra.
132. The requirements for the doctrine of part performance were set out in Miller v. McCamish,
78 Wn. 2d 821, 829, 479 P. 2d 919, 923-24 (1971) (quoting Grandquist v. McKean, 29 Wn. 2d 440,
445, 187 P.2d 623, 626 (1947)). These requirements are equally applicable to establishing what is
necessary for a promisee to recover expectancy recovery under promissory estoppel theory for a
contract that violates the Statute of Frauds. If a promisee is able to establish these elements, no
uncertainty will exist, and where no uncertainty exists in the oral agreement, the reason for the stat-
ute's application disappears. Miller at 829, 479 P.2d at 923-24.
133. Recovery would still require, however, the promisee to show that the promisor promised to
make a memorandum of the original promise. Klinke v. Famous Recipe Fried Chicken, Inc., 94 Wn.
2d 255, 616 P.2d 644 (1980).
